Concluding thoughts on ‘Networked Multilateralism: Upgrading Partnerships’ a joint UN Department of Peace Operations and Austrian Mission to the UN convening

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Late last week, I joined diplomats, thought leaders, representatives regional organizations, academia and think tanks at a conference titled ‘Networked Multilateralism – Upgrading Partnerships’ jointly organized by Austria Mission to the UN and UN Department of Peace Operations at Greentree in Long Island, New York.

The occasion provided great platform for reflecting on the current peace and security landscape, the challenges facing multilateralism and peacekeeping, the role regional organizations and partnership between the UN and regional organizations. One of the great features of the gathering was the diversity of stakeholders and perspectives represented in the day and half engaging discussions.

This reflection on the rich exchanges captures the concluding remarks I delivered at the final segment of the event. My remarks were centred on the following questions a) What is the state of peace and security and multilateralism today? b) What do the nature and characters of the international peace and security landscape mean for the UN and its various tools including PSOs? c) what needs to be done? by whom? and How?

The critical and insightful presentations and discussions highlighted the rise in the number of conflicts and their geographic spread. They pointed out how the nature of conflicts have also changed with the emergence to prominence of new drivers of insecurity such as transnational crime and climate change. But to make sense of the current worrying state of global peace and security, there is a need for understanding in what ways the nature of conflicts have changed and why the world is experiencing conflicts and violence at the scale and breadth not seen in many decades – covering the intersection of endogenous and exogenous causes ranging from growing development deficits to crisis of legitimacy and trust in state-society relationships and unbalanced international economic relations.

Yet, the peace and security landscape is not just characterised by complexities. Apart from the heightened need for addressing root causes of conflicts including the development and legitimate state capacity deficits, of significance in this respect is also the major changes in the power relations and dynamics of member states of the UN that hugely affects the functioning of multilateral bodies and the conditions that define the current unfair econmic relationships with its deleterious consequences to the development endeavors of developing countries in particular.

Both the nature and characters of the threat environment and the changes in the power structures of the international order bear major consequences for the UN and its longstanding peace and security tools such as peace support operations. First, the scale and complexity of the threats to international peace and security are such that no one entity by itself alone can effectively respond. They necessitate that the contributions of the global and the regional bobies are systematically harnessed and collaboratively mobilized to deploy the kind of joint response that the nature and character of the threat environment warrants. Partnership between the UN and regional organizations particularly the African Union also play critical role to mitigate the legitimacy deficit facing the UN peace and security architecture premised on post WWII power dispensation.

As the insightful interventions from great friends and colleagues revealed, the peace and security tools that the multilateral system has developed such as peacekeeping have come under enormous strain. The nature of the threats is such that they cannot be dealt with using traditional peacekeeping. There is increasing demand for peace enforcement, as lead response, in places such as the Sahel. Yet, peace enforcement is not not only a panacea but its value depends also on both its use as part of a comprehensive strategy (involving development, state building, and governance interventions) rather than as the only and prominent peace and security instrument and subject to the primacy of politics and respect for IHL and applicable human rights. Additionally, the current apathy to UN PKOs expressed through the reluctance of New York to deploy new PKOs and the recent trends in pushing existing UN operations in Africa, is not indicative of its future and the possibility of its use in tandem or sequentially with peace enforcement measures.

The elevation of the partnership between the UN and regional organizations, most notabky the AU and the rise in the role of the AU is constitute critical avenues for upgrading the multilateral system. However, this is not meant to be for diminishing the UN. It is rather as critical instrument of affirming the centrality of the UN. In this context, the reliance on the contribution of the AU should not be seen and done as a gap filling measure until the bad time the UN is having in the current peace and security and geopolitical environment fades away. It should rather be seen as an embodiment of the networked multilateralism that the world of the 2020s and beyond necessitates and demands. In this regard, Resolution 2719 should not be seen principally as a funding instrument but as providing the framework for elevated partnership between the UN and the AU for delivering the promise of the UN Charter through narnesding their respective comparative advanatges.

As insightfully pointed out and for purposes of the summit of the future, in the light of the speed, scale and nature of recent developments, it my be necessary for the UN to have the kind of exercise it previously had such as the Brahimi report and the HIPPO report. Alternatively, the UN Secretary-General may be requested to prepare and submit a report that takes stock of the challenges and changes and what they mean for UN PKO. Such exercise enables both to make an informed assessment of the state of affairs of the peace and security situation and the global geopolitical environment and what these mean for UN and its peace and security tools as well as on how best to reboot and reform the system for making it fit for purpose.

While I did not have time to get into details during making my concluding thoughts, it emerged that the various issues discussed during this interesting event touch of at least four themes.

The first concerns questions of principles and values. These cover the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, principles of legitimacy and universality, upholding IHL and human rights and equity. At a time when IHL has become under direct pressure in various conflict settings such as Gaza, Ukraine and Sudan, the demand for use of peace enforcement increases the risks for protection of civilians and respect for IHL. It was thus rightly emphasized the imperative for robust monitoring and compliance mechanisms. Of course, in the context of AU led peace operations, these can draw on the rich normative commitments to IHL and human rights in various AU instruments.

The second concerns the political. At one level this is about the politics of the UNSC and  the AU and its PSC and between the two. The political is also about the necessity of anchoring the use of peace support operations, including those involving peace enforcement on political strategy. The political also directly concerns the  role of host country stakeholders and them playing their part by seeking and actively implementing political processes for the resolution of the conflict.

The third is the technical. Here the concern is about the range of capacities that need to be enhanced, the elaboration of the various technical instruments, exchnage of information and best practices for partnership peacekeeping and in respect to the operationalization of UNSC resolution 2719.

The fourth aspect concerns the process and working methods dimension of the partnership equation. This pertains to the working modalities and arrangements both at the level of the UN and of the AU that need to be put in place for a dynamic and effective collective action. These include joint analysis, joint assessments, consultative decision-making, early action etc.

There were sobering moments during the two days highlighting not only the challenges arising from the grim realities of the current situation but also the resistance for making the necessary changes. A case in point is the example of the deletion of the word solidarity from the pandemic prepardness accord currently under negotiations proposed by the Africa Group due to resistance from countries of the global north, which points to the lack of will to address the root causes which are linked to development and equity in the international system. Indeed, the future of multilateralism and any progress to be made under the summit of the future depends on addressing the inequities that characterise the structure and processes of the multilateral system. There were also light moments. In the end, progress may depend on gin. Instructive is also the analogy of gin, tonic and lemon for partnership.

If there is one word that captures the issues discussed, it is multidimensionlity. Multidimensionality in terms of both the multiple actors whose role is essential for revamping multilateralism and the multiple instruments/tools that need to be deployed for effectively responding to the nature of conflicts and crises of this era.

The need to rethink AU’s COVID19 vaccine strategy

As countries in the world scramble for access to the COVID19 vaccine, Africa once again faces the risk of being left behind. In the meantime, with more than 3 million cases and the alarming spike in the spread of the virus on the continent leading to the reintroduction of curfews, lockdowns and declaration of states of emergencies, the imperative for speedy access to the vaccine has become even more pressing.

Africa will need 1.5 billion doses of vaccine in order to vaccinate 60% of its population—the estimated minimum requirement for achieving ‘herd’ immunity. Yet, Africa’s path for access to the required level of vaccine is very narrow.  A map of the world showing the status of the rolling out of COVID19 shows Africa as a part of the world where no vaccination has commenced, as a reflection of what Achelle Mbembe called ‘the global rule of health apartheid’.

In this context, African Union (AU) agency Africa Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (Africa CDC) head, John Nkengasong, warned that the world risks moral catastrophe if COVID19 vaccinations are delayed in Africa while wealthy countries are socking vaccines. WHO Director, Tedros Adhanom reiterated this stern warning in his latest address on 18 January. As an issue that concerns rights to health and life and global public good, of course much more than a ‘moral’ catastrophe is at stake. 

While there are more than 150 vaccine candidates with 56 already at the stage of human trials, a number of vaccines have been approved for use in China, Europe, Russia and the US. Most recently, Pfizer’s COVID19 vaccine and Moderna’s COVID19 vaccines have been approved and being administered in the US. In Europe, the vaccine comirnaty, developed by BioNTech and Pfizer, has also been approved by the EU. 

Much of the vaccine has been bought or ear marked for acquisition by economically well-off parts of the world. According a recent news report, none of those producing the vaccines approved in the US and Europe have plans to availing vaccines to Africa. Only, Pfizer Inc. and BionTech SE indicated to supply Africa with 50 million shots of the vaccine for health workers by the end of 2021. 

The current supply of vaccines, notwithstanding the speed of approval & production, is very limited. This has mostly to do with the market-based approach to the production of the vaccine which vests enormous power in the pharma industry to determine the production and distribution of the vaccine. Needless to say this is not in accord with the consideration of vaccines for the global COVID19 pandemic as global public good. The most effective way of speedy production and distribution of the vaccine is through the creation of conditions for its generic production and distribution.   

As a measure for averting the marginalization of African people from COVID19 vaccine, the continent’s premier human rights body, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in its Resolution 449 of its 66^th Ordinary Session held in July/August 2020 called on the AU to develop a strategy for making arrangements for the production and distribution of COVID19 vaccine within the continent. 

The AU through the Africa CDC has developed COVID19 vaccine development and access strategy. While this is good, the strategy covers only three areas 1) accelerate African involvement in the clinical development of the vaccine 2) access of sufficient share of the global vaccine supply and 3) remove barriers to widespread delivery and uptake of the vaccine. In November, President Cyril Ramaphosa of the Republic of South Africa, and Chairperson of the African Union, established the COVID-19 African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) to bolster the vaccine strategy endorsed by the AU Bureau of Heads of State and Government in August. 

Within the framework of the foregoing, the AU Chairperson announced that the AU has successfully negotiated to have access to 270 million doses of COVID19 vaccine from three major suppliers: Pfizer, AstraZeneca (through the Serum Institute of India) and Johnson and Johnson with 50 million being available for the critical period of April to June 2021. 

Notwithstanding the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) Facility which promises 2 billion doses for all countries in the world and is considered by the AU ‘vital for Africa’s response’, it is rightly observed by the AU that the target of 600 million doses from COVAX will cover only about 300 million people across the African Continent, which is only about 20 % of the population. The additional 270 million does not expand the percentage of the population that will be covered significantly either. 

As good a news as this is, it also highlights the limitations of the current approach. It depends on buying the vaccine doses from the pharma companies producing it. Such an approach shies away from including access to the technological knowhow of the vaccine and the intellectual property (IP) for the generic production and distribution of the vaccine on the African continent.

The World Health Organization (WHO) says transfer of technology is critical for manufacturing and distributing vaccines rapidly. Several barriers to scaling up the manufacture of Covid-19 vaccines could be addressed through collective actions of states, including conditions tied to vaccine funding that require technology transfer and the sharing of IP to allow mass and generic manufacturing of successful vaccine candidates. 

In terms of transfer of technology, one notable initiative is the call to action that has been initiated by Costa Rica with The Who to create the Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP)—a common shared pool of rights to technologies, data, and know-how that everyone around the world could use to manufacture any medical products needed to tackle Covid-19, including vaccines. Apparently, there are very few countries in Africa that have endorsed the C-TAP Solidarity Call to Action.  

With respect to addressing the IP regulations, in Octo­ber, India and South Africa put for­ward a pro­pos­al that the World Trade Orga­ni­za­tion (WTO) allows temporary waiver of the IP regulations, under the organization’s intel­lec­tu­al prop­er­ty agree­ment, ​“Trade-Relat­ed Aspects of Intel­lec­tu­al Prop­er­ty Rights,” or TRIPS. Now sup­port­ed by near­ly 100 coun­tries, the pro­pos­al would allow for the more afford­able pro­duc­tion of gener­ic treat­ments dur­ing the dura­tion of the pan­dem­ic. Unfortunately, this call is facing stiff resistance from many developed countries and indeed from the major pharmaceutical companies themselves. 

Yet, it is not clear what kind of more catastrophic health condition than COVID19 would justify the consideration of vaccine as global public good to which the rules on IP that apply for normal situaitons should be temporarily waived.  Complementing the Africa CDC Strategy and as part of the human rights-based call of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its Resolution 449 for the AU to create the conditions for enabling the generic manufacturing and distribution of the COVID19 vaccine within the continent, it is of paramount interest for Africa that the AU expands its strategy on COVID19 vaccine to include access by and transfer of the know-how and technology to Africa for the production of the COIVID19 vaccine and the waiver of the IP restrictions for enabling its speedy access by the people of the continent by supporting the initiatives of South Africa and India and Costa Rica and the WHO. 

This constitutes a critical addition to the current AU strategy to achieve, in the words of the AU Chairperson statement the containing of ‘the ever-changing toll of the pandemic in Africa’, hence the protection of people on the continent from the continuing threat of COVID19 to their rights to health and life. 

The COVID-19 pandemic and the defining human rights issues of our time

Introductory remark for a panel of the 66^th Session of the ACHPR – Making human rights priority in response to COVID-19 and planning for post-COVID19

The COVID-19 pandemic, as a bio-medical public health issue poses grave threat to health and life. It is most infectious. It causes serious illness. It is also deadly.

Its arrival and spread on our continent have been slow. Yet, its spread and the speed of the spread on our continent is gaining alarming pace.

With no vaccine to treat it, COVID19 continues to pose one of the most serious threats to the health and life of people. The rights to health and life are at stake.

But the fact that COVID19 is highly infectious and deadly does not by itself alone poses a threat to health and life. What has made COVID19 vicious is the conditions of vulnerability affecting the majority of people on our continent – poor health systems, absence of social protection, structural inequalities and pervasive poverty.

The masses of the people on our consentient lack access to basic health care services. Millions live in highly congested spaces. They live a life striped off dignity with no access to water, sanitation, education and decent housing. The vast majority of people on our continent, mostly women, depend on the informal economy based on performance of daily economic activities as petty traders of goods and services and daily laborers.

For all these categories of people hand washing, sanitizing, social distancing and self-isolation are not possible nor the possibilities of getting health care in the event of infection. Many have no home to shelter. No food stockpiles to remain confined in their homes. No regular income to avoid hunger and starvation.

COVID19 laid bare the failures of our economic and social policy making, the dangerous fragilities of the structure of our economies, the inability of the prevailing model of economic development, with its focus on GDP growth, to deliver for the wellbeing of the masses of the people and the weaknesses of our systems of governance, including the abusive institutional culture of security institutions in the name of upholding law and order and the appetite of some in government to pocket resources meant for fighting the pandemic.

With states adopting COVID19 response measures following the footsteps of other countries in the world, we have come to witness the emergence of a wide range of human rights issues affecting large number of people, most particularly the most vulnerable among us. People are forced to face insecurity not only from the lack of access to the conditions that make it possible for them to protect themselves from the virus but also from the human rights violations and abuses resulting from the COVID19 response measures and how those measures are enforced.

In the context of these structural socio-economic and governance fragilities and weaknesses, the various COVID19 response measures have exacerbated existing conditions of vulnerabilities and inequalities and created new dimensions of social, economic and political inequities.

We have received reports of people losing their lives due to excessive use of force by security forces, unable to have access to life saving services including access to health care and facing hunger and starvation.

With gender oppression exacerbated during the pandemic, women and girls have come to feel the full weight of the structural violence of patriarchy as they face unprecedented spike in GBV and sexual violence and as their reproductive work burden sharply increases.

The socio-economic impact of COVID-19 and its response measures continue to result in severe deprivations of the social and economic wellbeing of many people across the continent. The result is that tens of millions of people are being pushed to extreme poverty. Many more lose their jobs and sink into poverty.

The youth who account for the sizable portion of the population of the continent now face a bleak prospect with very limited or no socio-economic opportunities. With economies of the countries of the continent facing recession, millions of people facing loss of jobs and livelihoods, the impact of COVID19 can have catastrophic consequences for human rights.

Also affecting people on the continent and people of African descent are racism and inequitable international trade relations. As countries resort to hording and protectionist measures of limiting the market sell of medical supplies relating to COVID19, Africa has experienced restrictions of access to diagnostic test kits and therapeutics. There is concern that Africa may once again be put at the end of the que when vaccines are discovered if such vaccine is not discovered and produced on the continent.

Amidst all of the foregoing, the climate emergency continues to rage on across the world and on our continent. Countries have been affected by severe whether events including flooding, cyclones and parts of the continent continue to experience expansion of desertification destroying livelihoods and increasing inter-communal tension over scarce resources, and the locust invasion destroying crops and sources of food, exposing millions of people to food insecurity and starvation.

All of the foregoing show that we are, to quote from the last report of the UN Rapporteur on poverty, Phillip Alston, at an ‘existential crossroads’. As we respond to COVID19 and plan for a post-COVID19 order, we cannot afford to underestimate the gravity of the challenge we face. Indeed, what we face is a generational challenge. What we face is the defining human rights issue of this era – deepening inequalities, pervasive and expanding poverty, racism, sexism and gender oppression, the democratic governance crisis and the climate emergency. Whether and how we respond to these issues could prove to be the litmus test of a success for building back better and achieve a just system of democratic governance in which gender oppression is defeated and a human centered paradigm of economic development in harmony with nature.

 

How best are African countries like Ethiopia responding to COVID19?

As at 23 March 2020, the number of countries in Africa reporting confirmed cases of COVID19  has increased to 44 from the fist report in Egypt on 23 February. The spread of the virus on the continent has during this period been on a steady rise. During one of his press briefing the WHO Chief, Dr Tedros addressing Africa said ‘big gatherings should be banned …. Africa must wake up, my continent must wake up’.

On 22 March the Deputy Head of the Africa Centre for Disease Control of the African Union rang the alarm bell warning African states that Africa is in the ‘morning of the #COVID19 outbreak’ & went on to state that ‘When the rate is compared to #Europe, the message is ACT FAST to #FlattenTheCurve’

Africa shifted in a mater of two weeks from being a continent watching the spread of the virus in other parts of the world to becoming a continent facing the gathering storm of #COVID19. As the spread of the virus marches across the continent while COVID19 ravages countries with well endowed economic and health systems, African countries started, rather slowly and hesitantly in some instances, to announce various preventive and containinment measures (hand washing, ban of physical contact, social distancing, ban of gatherings in large numbers, closure of schools etc).

Both the spread of the virus on the continent and the beginning of the announcement of prevention and containment measures by affected states, major debates ensued across the continent. The debates centered around how best countries like Ethiopia should respond, what are the combination of measures that have the prospect of flattening the curve and how best these measures can be designed to fit local context and how best they are crafted and executed effectively.

1. From the experience of countries affected by the virus and those that make progress in flattening the curve of the spread of the virus, the very first and most important step is recognition of the seriousness of the threat the spread of the COVID19 poses to the health, life and social-economic wellbeing of individuals, families, communities and the society as a whole. The novel coronavirus is a new virus that spreads rapidly and leads to serious respiratory illness with major fatality rate particularly on old people and people with underlying health conditions. It’s spread not only overwhelms health systems & risks the lives of people in large number but also capable of severe disruptions to the lives of individuals, families and communities & the functioning of the national economy.

The first test of whether a state in Africa such as Ethiopia has risen to the occasion in responding to the COVID19 pandemic is the level of recognition of the gravity of the threat the pandemic poses.

2. It has also emerged from the experience of the countries that made progress in containing the virus that countries with clear plan for the prevention and containment of COVID19 that is designed taylored to the particular context of the country and scale of the spread can stand the chance of limiting community transmission. Such plan not only manifests the recognition by decision-makers of the gravity but also serves as the basis for introducing the relevant prevention behavioral steps and public health measures.

The second test for assessing the response of a government to COVID19 is the existence of well crafted and clear plan. The plan should have clear articulation of the nature of the threat,  pandemic that presents a serious threat to public health, the range of measures required to prevent and contain the threat, the implementation mechanisms including mobilization of emergency responders and (the logistical, technical and financial) resources, the timely introduction of the range of measures as situation evolves, communication strategy, mitigation measures to ease the determental impacts of the serious measures particularly on the most vulnerable sections of society, clear execution strategy and follow through and monitoring and follow up mechanisms (including judicial supervision)

3) For effective and legally grounded response, it is imperative that measures are adopted on the basis of duly enacted law of general application. In the absence of such a law on which response measures are introduced, there will be serious problem of legal certainty, risk of arbitrariness and abuse of state power and unpredictability and incoherence on the range of measures that could be adopted. The law can be one adopted for purposes of mobilizing the response to the specific public health problem (Senegal is introducing a law declaring a state of emergency) or based on an existing law deigned to deal with major social and health crises such as the (National Desaster Act of South Africa).

Whether response is grounded on a duly enacted law of general application is the third test by reference to which the performance of states in Africa is to be assessed.

4) In terms of the specific prevention and containment measures, from the WHO advisory and experience of countries affected by the virus, it has become clear that countries need to introduce a combination of preventive individual and socio-economic behavioral measures and the accompanying public health measures. These include avoiding touching common surfaces, thorough and regular hand washing with soap for at least 40 seconds, using sanitizers where watching is not possible, avoid touching face, avoid physical contacts with others and social distancing and ban of public gatherings of all kinds beyond a certain threshold (ranging from 2 in Germany to 100 in South Africa), closure of schools, limiting or banning of movements and suspension of works reaching to a point of total lockdown.

As WHO chief Dr Tedros aptly put it in a tweet on 23 March, ‘Asking people to stay at home and other physical distancing measures are an important way of slowing down the spread of the virus and buying time – but they are defensive measures. You can’t win a football game only by defending. You have to attack as well.’ Accordingly, these ‘defensive’ measures have to be accompanied by the public health measures of vast screening, testing, contact tracing, isolation, quarantine & treatment and care.

In this context, the test for assessing the effectiveness of the measures introduced based on whether the measures involve the right combination, whether they are introduced early enough to have the impact, and whether they are formulated in clear and precise terms leaving no gap for ambiguity or uncertainty in terms of knowing what is required and what is banned. Timing is a major factor, the earlier a country introduces the ‘defensive’ measures, the better chance it has to flatten the curve.

5. Implementation and compliance with respect to the ‘defensive measures’ are critical. It has been said that the slowing down of the spread depends on individual and social behavior – each individual being on the frontline of the fight against COVID19.

The fifth test is whether the measures are compulsory or only advised and whether they are communicated and formulated in clear and unambiguous terms. Clarity is another major factor. The clearer and more precise the formulation and communication of the ‘defensive’ measures with limited and highly regulated exceptions, the more chance you have for a higher level of compliance with the measures.

There is also the important question of communication – how are leaders behaving when they address and when they hold meetings and when the inform the public on why heeding the ‘defensive’ measures is important. If people feel that the virus affects mostly old people or others with other illness, and/or if they feel that the virus is like any serious flu like disease, and/or if people feel that you can get the virus only from symptomatic people, there is very little chance of achieving wider compliance. So question is – are people told that this virus is deadly, that heeding these measures is an imperative to avoid severe sickness and death to self or other people, and that each individual should behave as if she is infected with the virus and as if every other person that they run into in public places also carry the virus irrespective of symptoms?

There is also the issue of general application of the measures. In this regard the question is whether the ban on public gatherings applies to only to social meetings or whether it applies to all gatherings of a certain magnitude whether such gatherings are political, religious or social. If inconsistent whereby a state closes schools but allows pretty much all other kinds of gatherings including political and religious meetings, the resultant inconsistency and hence the confusing messaging means that the state fails the test totally.

From the various states that introduced yhes measures, those that have set the benchmark for best practice include South Africa and Rwanda.

6) Contextual tailoring of ‘defensive Measures’ is another profoundly important aspect of the equation for effectiveness of the measures in the African context. In a context in which large portion of the population live in highly congested areas, slums and informal settlements, with no access to water and soap for washing hands, use public transport where social distancing is impossible, the introduction of the ‘defensive measures’ should involve the provision of the means for following with such measures – daily desinfection and deep cleaning of congested neighborhoods, distribution of sanitizers, the establishment of portable washing stations with soap along with advocacy interventions to facilitate some level of compliance. Similarly, given the fact that the vast majority of people depend on daily engagement in economic activities in the informal sector, such measures as social distancing, hand washing, avoiding gathering is unlikely to be observed. This can be enforced with the introduction of complete loackdown as in Rwanda or South Africa only if mitigating measures involving the provision of food items, consumables, and direct cash grants are also provided for the social-economically vulnerable people.

In this respect, the test is whether the defensive measures have taken due account of this reality in the country and tailor its implementation to the needs and conditions of the masses of the poor to protect them from the virus. The adoption therefore of what are called community bailout measures are key in this respect to ensure that the economically vulnerable are not pushed into not having food to eat, water to drink and medical support.

7) Then there is the issue of the strategy for dealing with people infecsted with the virus. In this respect, having clarity on how much the health system can provide treatment and care and for who and on what grounds requires clarity, the sourcing of the supplies, logistics and technical capacity for such treatment and care and the mechanism for dealing with others for who treatment and care could not be provided by the health system.

The test in this context is the existence of a strategy for treatment and care. But this may not be the area where many African states can find themselves to be in a position to do that well given the poor state of our health system, although this does not preclude the need for strategy.

8) Equally important is to introduce monetary and other supports measures for cushioning the adverse economic and social impacts of the measures particularly when the measures lead to closure of businesses, factories and other institutions.

This concerns with the measures for economic bailout of workers and businesses. In this respect, while African states don’t have the resources and capacity, they should put in place such measures as postponing certain payments, provision of tax breaks, special dispensation for most affected workers and small and medium businesses etc for easing the economic impact.

9) Finally, clear framework for monitoring and evaluation is critical which requires the establishment of an emergency committee or command post subject to judicial supervision for reviewing the measures and their implementation of measures based on the data from the monitoring and evaluation.

The test in this regard may include the whether the state has put place in place a framework and structure for monitoring, evaluation and review as well as regular communication on the same.

I am not a public health expert. I am a human rights practitioner. The foregoing is informed by a review using the human rights lense and a rough review of the emerging lessons from the responses to COVID19 in the continent and outside.

It is an attempt at providing some preliminary criteria to answer the question of how good or badly our states are responding to the threat that the COVID19 pandemic poses to the health and life of the public. Felt that better to pen my thoughts down in my blog than tweeting them, hence this blog is written instead of my tweeting on this question.

How well or badly is your country doing and how would this affect the health and life of the public?

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Addressing Ethiopia’s winter of despair: PM Abiy’s homework after the Nobel peace prize

If the mood in Ethiopia was to be represented in a graph after the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2019, it would reflect one of those uniquely high rising peaks capturing the joy and celebration that erupted in the country.

Yet the transition under PM Abiy Ahmed has for the past year and half launched Ethiopia both into its spring of hope and winter of despair. As the world bets on Ethiopia’s spring of hope by conferring this award on PM Abiy, the imperative to address Ethiopia’s spring of despair has become ever more pressing, not least on account of the few months left for the national elections expected in 2020.

The award rightly attracted widespread excitement, patriotic pride and celebration. In a tweet she posted following the announcement, Ethiopia’s first female President Sahle-Work Zewde proclaimed ‘Congratulations PM! You Deserve it! Congrats our beloved Ethiopia! Congrats to all Ethiopians at home and abroad’. Similarly, Ethiopia’s first chief justice Meaza Ashenafi tweeted ‘Congratulations to PM Abiy! All Ethiopian men and women who uphold peace shall rejoice by the award of #NobelPeacePrize @AbiyAhmed’.

Mustefe Omer, Vice President of the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, while expressing his extreme delight, said in a statement that ‘PM Abiy deserves the recognition for bringing peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, peace process in Sudan and for the …reform agenda in Ethiopia.’ These are the sentiments that many within and outside the country expressed.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement, despite all the challenges facing it, was a remarkable breakthrough. It ended nearly two-decades of tension and rivalry that destabilized the entire region. This feat could not have been achieved had it not been for Abiy Ahmed’s conviction and determination to end the stalemate that brought enormous socio-economic, political and security cost on the peoples of the two countries and the region.As the press release from the Nobel Committee suggests, it is this and the peace efforts in the Horn of Africa region more than anything else that earned PM Abiy the prize.

Yet this prize is also of huge significance for PM Abiy’s role at home. Indeed, the Nobel prize award has injected a much-needed boost to what I consider to be the spring of hope in Ethiopia’s transition. At a time when the winter of despair continues to dominate the skies of Ethiopia with a cloud of uncertainty, polarization and tension, the award brought out the sense of patriotic unity, hope and elation characteristic of the spring of hope prominent in the early months following PM Abiy’s ascent to power.

As Ethiopians rejoice by this prestigious recognition, the various challenges facing PM Abiy and threatening Ethiopia’s transition did not escape many. Even the Nobel Committee in its statement admitted that ‘many challenges remain unresolved. Ethnic strife continues to escalate, and we have seen troubling examples of this in recent weeks and months.’ As the Committee was announcing PM Abiy as winner of the prize, news of road closure on the main road connecting the Amhara regional state with the capital city Addis Ababa was also making the rounds.

Jawar Mohammed, an influential political activist and executive director of Oromo Media Network, told CNN that ‘Prime Minister Abiy has done a wonderful job in bringing peace with and within the neighboring countries’. He added that the PM ‘has to do a lot more to bring peace and stability domestically and to ensure the transition to democracy succeeds.’

On this score, many share Jawar’s remarks. There is wide recognition that it is what happens in the home front that is sure to determine how the standing of PM Abiy will stand and fail. As great as the hopes and positive changes of Ethiopia – spring of hope – are, the country also faces as much, if not stronger, challenges – winter of despair. The challenge for PM Abiy is to avoid that Ethiopia’s winter of despair would not lead him to face the unenviable fall from grace befallen Myanmar’s leader Ang Sang Suki, another Nobel Peace Laureate.

It is on this account that the resolution of the major sources of the crisis facing Ethiopia’s transition becomes the major prize that is awaiting PM Abiy. Most notably, the country has come to experience worrying levels of ethnic based contestations that in various parts of the country resulted in incidents of violence leading to loss of lives and displacement of some three million Ethiopians.

Although it is not uncommon to attribute the current challenges to the widening of the political space in Ethiopia, that democratization is not the source of the problem cannot be overemphasized. The main challenge of the country lies in the lack of the emergence of a new settlement replacing the post 1991 political settlement that collapsed with the emergence of PM Abiy as the new leader of Ethiopia in early 2018. The crises the transition has encountered is a result mainly of the fact that the democratization process is not founded on such a national settlement.

While at the ideological level the main axis of contestation is between the forces of Ethiopian nationalism and those of ethnicity-based nationalisms, in the political realm there are two major sites of the crisis of the transition.

The first of this is the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF is not like any other ruling party. It is inseparably infused into the structures of the Ethiopian state at the federal level and with each of the four ethnic member parties of the EPRDF controlling the structures of the major self-governing regional members of the Ethiopian federation. The infighting between these four ethnic parties tends to automatically descend into confrontation between the regional governments. As a recent report noted, ‘tensions between states, especially the three most powerful – Oromia, Amhara and Tigray – worsened as relations in the EPRDF soured.’

Upsurge of hate-mongering ethno-nationalisms and contestations at the regional and local levels between the new forces unleashed into the political system and the member of the EPRDF controlling the region or minorities residing in the regions have become the second major site of the crises facing this transition. This is the site of the crisis with which much of the ethnic clashes and the accompanying displacements are associated. A case in point is the conflict in Gedio that forced over a million people from their homes. Other examples include the conflict relating to Qimant in Amhara region or more recently the conflict involving the Sidama in Southern Ethiopia or the sporadic clashes in west Oromia.

These major sources of Ethiopia’s winter of despair require PM Abiy to pursue his vision of reconciliation with the same level of conviction, tact and tenacity as in the areas associated with Ethiopia’s spring of hope. At the level of the EPRDF, observers (see here and here) rightly point out that there is a need for initiating a process of rapprochement and reconciliation that leads to the re-organization of the EPRDF to achieve a new political vision and framework for working together. As an editorial of the largest English weekly newspaper  pointed out, ‘such bargaining is not easy. It demands not only ‘humility to at least listen to other views’ but also ‘to make painful concessions.’

There is also a need for arranging a dialogue and political negotiation with the various political forces outside of the EPRDF fold, including those that have emerged into the political arena after the opening of the political space by PM Abiy. Such negotiation is needed to achieve a political settlement and an agreed roadmap both at the national and federal states level. The settlement and accompanying roadmap would ensure that these political forces operate within an agreed parameter and have a framework for dialogue and dispute resolution. This is key to avert the tendency of using violence to pursue a political agenda that is becoming recurrent. In all of these, PM Abiy should prioritize the views of Ethiopians including those not part of his support base rather than others.

If PM Abiy uses the boost that the Nobel Prize brought for the spring of hope in the transition to catalyze and deliver on these negotiations within EPRDF and among the wider political forces of the country and does so before the national elections expected to take place in 2020, it would remove the winter of despair in Ethiopia’s transition and put his role beyond reproach. We are all invested in the success in this front. The future of Ethiopia depends on it.

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On Tom Burgis’s The Looting Machine – a book on the systematic theft of Africa’s wealth

In a speech that I delivered in July 2016, I spoke about the power of big business and the human rights protection vacuum in Africa. As I briefly expounded in that speech, the human rights protection vacuum is a product of a confluence of factors. These are the enormous scale of the economic, socio-cultural and political power that big business has come to amass in the age of globalization, the lack of legal obligation and direct responsibility of corporations for human rights and the poor bargaining power of African states and the pervasive institutional and regulatory weakness prevalent on the continent.

As highlighted in the speech, in Africa nowhere is the impact of the human rights protection vacuum is more pronounced than in the extractive industries sector. At the time, one of the books I drew on to portray the danger the power of big business poses on the African continent was Ngugi wa Thiogo’s novel the Wizard of the Crow, particularly what he termed in the novel corpolonialism.

A year before the speech in which I articulated the concept of the human rights protection vacuum a book of magnificent depth on the so-called resource curse was published. The book is, The Looting Machine: Warlords, Tycoons, Smugglers and Systemic Theft of Africa’s Wealth by Tom Burgis. Published in 2015 in the United Kingdom by William Collins, the Looting Machine is unparalleled, to my knowledge, in its in-depth analysis of the power structure that lies behind not only what Burgis calls ‘systemic theft of Africa’s wealth’ or in Thogo’s formulation corpolialism. But I also found it awesomely insightful in its analysis of the factors that created the human rights protection vacuum, that has been a focus of my preoccupation since I have been tasked with the responsibility of leading the work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations in Africa.

The Looting Machine starts with a dive into an interrogation of what may be termed the trouble with Africa (to paraphrase from Chinua Achebe’s famous essay The Trouble with Nigeria) in general and the phenomenon of the resource curse in particular. Burgis observes there ‘are plenty of theories as to the cause of the continent’s penury and strife’. ‘Colonizers had ruined Africa, some of the theorists contended, its suffering compounded by the diktats of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; others considered Africans incapable of governing themselves, excessively ‘tribal’ and innately given to corruption and violence. There were those who thought Africa was largely doing just fine but that journalists seeking sensational stories and charities looking to tag at donors’ heartstrings distorted its image.’ While eschewing the simplistic analysis that blames the troubles of Africa on conflicts from ‘ancient hatred’, the Looting Machine seeks to excavate the multiple and intricately interwoven forces and factors accounting for it.

In a way that captures the confused state of contemporary economic policy making in Africa including the forces shaping it, Burgis notes ‘prescriptions were as various and contradictory as the diagnoses: slash government spending to allow private businesses to flourish; concentrate on reforming the military, promoting ‘good governance’ or empowering women; bombard the continent with aid; or force open African markets to drag the continent into the global economy.’

The Looting Machine notes that rather than being ‘some unfortunate economic phenomenon, the product of an intangible force’, the resource curse is a direct result of ‘systematic looting’. Burgis traces the origins of the resource curse to the colonial past with the plunder of Southern Africa, in the nineteenth century, the trading of slaves, gold and palm oil along Africa’s Atlantic sea-board and the flow of crude oil in Nigeria by the middle of the twentieth century. A major factor that has condemned resource rich African countries to the curse of riches, according to the Looting Machine, is the retention by ‘corporate behemoths of the resource industry’ of ‘their interests’ upon the departure of ‘European colonialists’ and the achievement by African states of their sovereignty.

Burgis also debunks the prevalent image of Africa as a burden to the world and one that contributes little to the global economy. As he pointed out, ‘[o]utsiders often think of Africa as a great drain of philanthropy, a continent that guzzles aid to no avail and contributes little to the global economy in return’. Lending further evidence to the findings of the African Union/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki that Africa gives far more money ($50 billion by way of illicit financial flows) than it receives in aid, Burgis observes that a close look at the resource industry shows that the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world is far from what the recipient-donor narrative presents. The ‘basic commodities that lie in abundance in Africa remain the primary ingredient of the global economy’, with fuel and mineral exports from Africa in 2010, for example, accounting for $333 billion, more than seven times the value of the aid that went in the opposite direction.

This introductory part of the book concludes with a presentation of what the looting machine is made up of – ‘networks of multinationals, middlemen and African potentates’ or ‘local potentates, oil executives, the mining magnets and the globetrotting middlemen’. In a way that more accurately captures the reality of the sources of Africa’s trouble, Burgis writes ‘[t]hese networks fuse state and corporate power’. He goes on to note that ‘[t]hey are aligned to no nation and belong instead to the transnational elites that have flourished in the era of globalization. Above all, they serve their own enrichment.’ As it becomes evident from the analysis in the various chapters of the book, other forces abetting and conniving with the looting machine include international law (particularly international trade and investment law), the global financial institutions, and the major economies where the leading extractive companies are domiciled and the price of the resources extracted from Africa are set.

In the rest of the chapters, the book interrogates with a hard-nosed approach the grip that the looting machine established across the breadth and width of Africa – from Angola and Nigeria with their oil, to the Democratic Republic of Congo with its coltan and diamonds, Guinea with its bauxite, Niger with its uranium, Ghana with its Gold, and South Africa with its platinum and diamond. It also reveals the way the looting machine operates both to keep the wrenched of these resource rich countries poor and to fuel the profits of multinational companies and the economies of the developed countries.

In Angola, where oil accounts for 98 percent of its exports and three-quarters of government’s income, the looting machine involved the political elite, the leadership of the national oil company Sonangol, a ‘bearded, bespectacled chinses man called Sam Pa’, Joe Bryant and extractive multinationals from China and the West. It operated not only on the basis of delivery to local officials ‘of a suitcase stuffed with cash’ but also the use of local companies that operate as a front for the stake that military, political and Sonangol officials take in the richest mining ventures of multinational companies such as Cobalt from the US and China Sonangol.

The systematic looting results in numerous disasters to the national economy, the environment, stability and security, state-society relationship, and generally to the social and economic welfare of the masses of the people of the affected countries. From the wars it funneled in Angola, the DRC and Nigeria to the military coup in Niger and to the Marikana massacre in South Africa, much of the trouble with Africa’s resource rich states is associated with the looting machine. Burgis writes, in relation to Nigeria, for example, the ethnic, religious and political violence that claimed the lives of ‘some eighteen thousand Nigerians between 1999 and 2012’ is ‘the result of Nigeria’s poisonous petro-politics.’ He goes on to note that in ‘these direct acts of violence alone – not counting all of the children slipping away in dilapidated hospitals, the drivers who meet their end on roads where maintenance contracts have been embezzled, and the victims of a police force that is more predator than protector – the Nigerian looting machine claims a life every six hours’.

Arguably, no other African country endured as much misfortune for its riches as the DRC. While the minerals in provinces such as the Katanga served as drivers of past conflicts, in more recent times the looting machine in the DRC fueled violence in the East of the country. The ‘coltan trade has helped fund local militias and foreign armies that have terrorized eastern Congo for two decades, turning what should be a paradise into a crucible of war.’

The Looting Machine also presents evidence of how the struggle over Africa’s resources between the West and China fuels conflict and military coup, best captured in the Chapter titled ‘When Elephants Fight, the Grass Gets Trampled’. Such was the case in Niger where, the struggle between France, former colonial ruler of Niger that ‘enjoyed a de facto monopoly on the staff that makes Niger a place of strategic importance – its uranium,’ and China, which furnished Niger’s President Tanja with huge sum of money ‘[i]n return for permits to dig uranium and rights to drill Niger’s previously untapped reservoirs of oil,’ reportedly contributed to the conflict involving the Tuareg rebellion and the coup against Tanja.

The looting machine operates through the instrumentality of the enormous bargaining power of extractive industries vis-à-vis weak African states. This involves the use of exploitative terms, tax doges or ‘transfer pricing’. ‘In gold mining,’ writes Burgis, ‘the standard rate of mining royalties …is settled at about 3 per cent across the continent, among the lowest anywhere in the world.’ It is in The Looting Machine that one comes close enough to realize the descriptions ‘pillaging Africa’ or ‘bleeding the countries of the continent’ to be no hyperbole but accurate representations of Africa’s experience with the extractive industries and the human rights protection vacuum. For example, Burgis reports of the $2.1 billion that the mining industry in Ghana generated in 2008, ‘the sum of royalties, taxes, and dividends from government stakes in mining ventures paid to the state was $146 million, or 7 per cent – and that is before factoring in the cost to the state of the subsidized electricity the mines use.’ This is, he rightly points out, ‘pittance compared with the 45 to 65 per cent that the IMF estimates to be the global average effective tax rate in mining’.

Secrecy of licensing contracts and exploitative terms are at the core of the systematic looting. In Niger, the licensing contracts of Areva, a French mining company that enjoyed monopoly in the extraction of uranium for decades, are not published but its most recent decade-long agreements running to the end of 2013 obtained by reporters showed that ‘Areva was exempt from paying duties both on the mining equipment it imported and the uranium it exported. The royalty…was 5.5 per cent on the uranium it mined, well below that charged by other, wealthier countries and locked in by a clause exempting the company from any increase in the rate under new mining laws.’

The looting machine does not stop with such exploitative terms. It siphons off more money even from the little that it offers to the institutionally weak African states. Thus, even ‘when African governments ignore the threats and blandishments of the World Bank and the resource industry and manage to secure a greater share of the revenues from oil and minerals (as DRC and Tanzania attempted to do, for example, during 2017/2018 by revising their mining laws), ‘there is little they can do to stop the torrent of money that flows out of their countries through tax fiddles made possible by the globalization of finance.’

Not surprisingly, Burgis makes it abundantly clear that despite the many changes there is substantial continuity between the colonial past and the post-colonial present, particularly in as far as the troubles that Africa endures from the extractive industry is concerned. He notes, ‘[i]n many African resource rich states the oil and mining industries took hold before independence, before the new born nations had had a chance to develop institutions to steward the common good and circumscribe arbitrary power’. Answering who the contemporary Cecil Rhodes that overlord on the continent are, Burgis has this to say ‘Areva in Niger, Shell in Nigeria, Glencore in Congo – they and others like them replicate in their sheer power over African nations the empires that came before them.’

Of course, Burgis is alive to the differences between the new resource empires and the old. Thus, in the middle of the book he observes the ‘power structure of the new resource empires differ from those that the likes of Rhodes built in one striking way: they comprise a lot more black faces at higher levels…Today in Africa’s resource states the local potentates are equal partners with the oil executives, the mining magnates and the globetrotting middlemen’, although this equality goes against his own analysis on the sheer power that these other actors are able to marshal. But this is not the only way that the new differs from the old. This is best captured in the introductory chapter, where Burgis observes ‘[w]here once treaties signed at gunpoint dispossessed Africa’s inhabitants of their land, gold and diamonds, today phalanxes of lawyers representing oil and mineral companies with annual revenues in the hundreds of billions of dollars impose miserly terms on African governments and employ tax doges to bleed profit from destitute nations.’

So, who benefits and who suffers from the looting machine and the accompanying human rights protection vacuum? One obvious category of beneficiary is the African potentates and the losers are the ordinary Nigerian, Angolan, Congolese, South African, Ghanaian or Nigerian woman. As Burgis also points out, the disparity – between life in the places where those resources fueling the world economy (of the era of communications technology) are found and the places where the price of the resources are set and the benefits are consumed – ‘gives an indication of where the benefits of the oil and mining trade accrue – and why most Africans still barely scrap by.’ Thus, ‘for every woman who dies in childbirth in France, a hundred die in the desert nation of Niger, a prime source of the uranium that fuels France’s nuclear-powered economy. The average Finn or South Korean can expect to live to eighty, nurtured by economies among whose most valuable companies are, respectively, Nokia and Samsung, the world’s top two mobile phone manufacturers. By contrast, if you happen to be born in the DRC, home to some of the planet’s richest deposits of the minerals that are crucial to manufacture of mobile phone batteries, you’ll be lucky to make it past fifty.’

In her review of The Looting Machine, Michela Wrong charges that ‘Frustratingly, Burgis never addresses the question of what can be done to halt — or at least brake — the systematic looting.’ But the book is principally about tracing and identifying the actors and mechanisms that make up the looting machine – the political elites, local militias or warlords, the middlemen, the lawyers and accountants, the extractive companies and the wider trading and investment legal regime. While what can be done has not been the focus of the book, in the afterword of the book Burgis asks, by way of starting the discussion on what needs to be done, ‘what if companies were subject to a duty of care to prevent corruption’? a standard higher than the current standard of due diligence advanced in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which leaves a lot of room for doing little or nothing.

In the work that the ACHPR’s Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights have undertaken since at least I took the responsibility of chairing it, it has made its major focus on filling in the legal gaps that continue to enable the looting machine or the systematic looting of Africa and the attendant human rights abuses and violations. These efforts have produced key normative instruments, notably Resolution 367 of the African Commission and the State Reporting Guidelines and Principles on Articles 21 and 24 of the African Charter that have the potential to improve the natural resource governance regime in Africa. Perhaps it is in these and similar other efforts such as the process within the UN for developing a binding business and human rights treaty that Wrong can find answer to her frustrations on Burgis’s ‘brave, defiant book’, as she described The Looting Machine.

What next after bloody Saturday: Ethiopia needs a new political consensus, it needs it urgently

Like millions of my fellow country women and men, I am shocked and sadned by the events of Ethiopia’s bloody Saturday. Yes, the killings that took place in Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa are outrageous and tragic on their own. As we mourn those killed and condemn these atrocious acts, we need to mobiliz our emotions, if only for the memory of those killed, for chnaging the condition that has made these acts possible.

Thus, we need to prob what these killings represent and what they tell us about the state of health or lack thereof in our political system,  perhaps more accurately in the transition that the country has embarked on. In the paragraphs that follow I try to prob these questions, perhaps as a sequel to Ethiopia’s spring of hope and winter of despair, which I wrote almost a year ago.

The emergence of PM Abiy Ahmed as the leader of the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front and Ethiopai’s Prime Minster ushered in a new era of politics. It becomes an era that marked the end of the politics of criminalization of dissent. It opened the prison doors and let political prisoners and dissidents free. It rescinded sentences imposed on journalists and political dissidents in exile.

In this new era of politics, PM Abiy’s government also invited back to the country political forces of all colors and pursuations in exile back to the country. In an act demonstrative of how far the new politics traveled to depart from the past, this new politics even went as far as sponsoring by government of the return of political opposition, including armed opposition groups.  On their arrival, all those political movements and armed opposition groups were greeted with a red carpet treatment with high level government officials including at times PM Abiy himself welcoming them from the airport.

In a departure from the politics of paranoia of the past that treated many politically active non-EPRDF Ethiopians as suspects, this era of politics has become one that accepted Ethiopians outside of the ruling EPRDF as members of society who can be entrusted with roles in various areas of public life. It has accordingly brought to the various institutions of government individuals with diverse background and professional pedigree.

Singnaling an intention to institutionalize the political reforms that the country embarked on, PM Abiy reformist government also initiated a law reform process. To this end, it tasked a new law reform advisory council made up of independent and highly competent legal minds of the country with the task of reviewing the draconian laws that silenced all voices outside of the EPRDF mold. Of particular note in this regard are the anti terrorism law, the press law and the charities law. With this initiative, it facilitated legislative changes for removing from statute books these laws that stifle civic and fundamental freedoms of citizens. Beyond these, the law reform initiative also addresses democratic governance laws and institutions, including most notably the review of the electoral law and the electoral commission.

In a move that took many by surprise, the new era of politics saw the removal from power of the leaders of two of the most powerful security institutions in the country, the army and the intelligence. In both these institutions, various reform measures have also been inteoduced. As part of the reform of the security sectors and in an attempt to change abusive institutional cultures, the leadership of prison administrations accused of hineous acts of violence against inmates were also removed from their positions.

In an attempt to mend social divisions in the country, PM Abiy also initiated efforts of reconciliation among the followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and of Islam in Ethiopia.

All of these and similar other inistiaves have completely transformed the political landscape of the country. They principally changed the power architecture of the country. The balance of power in the EPRDF in particular witnessed a shift that saw the emergence into prominence of the Oromo Democratic Party. Political actors and forces that were in exile are establishing themselves, with some of them already showing themselves to be felt on the ground, albeit often for the wrong reasons. New political forces such as the Amhara National Movement, have also been formed and unleashed.

On the part of the public, the rise to position of power of PM Abiy and the various political reforms his administration introduced have been greeted with jubilation. The unique level of public good will extended to PM Abiy have made many observers to observe that his is a popularity unprecedented in the country. Indeed, the support that PM Abiy galvanized transcended his political home base of Oromia. Indeed, he has attracted the support from people from various all walks of life across religious, gender, generational, political and ethnic boundaries.

So, this reform has presented Ethiopia a unique opportunity for overcoming its political decay and start a new chapter for achieving an inclusive, rule based and democratic political order. Ethiopians have rightly and understandably have their hopes high, although there were also many who were cautiously optimistic. Indeed, this has been a new era of politics for dreaming big and high.

Not surprisingly as well, for the transition to succeed and these reforms to yield their ultimate results, they would certainly have benefited from the involvement of various sectors of society. They would also have benefited from the application of certain democratic principles, notably transparent and participatory decision making process. It would also have benefited if it was driven not only by PM Abiy Ahmed and his team but also by all the key members of the ruling coalition. Perhaps, more than anything else, the transition and the reforms would have also benefited if they were founded on a political settlement.

It can be gathered from the foregoing, the changes that have been introduced in the country under PM Abiy Ahmed have affected the political and security power dynamics and structural set up of the country. In other words,  the changes swept away the elite bargain and compromise on which the past balance of power was organized. They have also brought to an end the political settlement or consensus on which the politics of the country has been premised for about a couple of decades. Also thrown out of the window have been some of the fundamental rules that governed the conduct of business of the ruling coalition. Democratic centralism was no more. Thus, the reform measures were initiated through the sheer and audacious political will of the PM and his team.

Surely, the sweeping away of the previous elite bargain was not unexpected. After all, PM Abiy’s ascent to power came as a result not only of the internal power struggle in the EPRDF but also of the protest campaign and pressure for change mobilized in the country for several years since at least 2015. Not also surprising was the coming to an end of the political consensus/settlement on whose basis the politics of the country have operated. Given the unprecedented manner in which PM Abiy was elected in the EPRDF, there was also little surprise that the ruling coalition silently allowed its long standing decision-making doctrine of democratic centralism to go out of use.

Arguably, more than the reforms highlighted above involving the wide opening up of the political space in the country greeted with a great deal of understandable euphoria, the sweeping away of the previous elite compromise and the accompanying political settlement as well as the established way of operating of EPRDF have been most consequential for the system and the country.

For any political system to continue performing optimally and delivering for the public, it needs to operate on the basis of an existing bargain hammered out among major political forces and the political settlement emerging from that. In the absence of a political consensus required for its optimal functioning, a society unavoidably faces major uncertainty. In the absence of such consensus, no sector of society can be sure of its future in the political system. In a context of reforms, such uncertainties often lead to a classical situation of prisoners’ dilemma and hence leading to miscalculations and misperceptions. The situation becomes even more volatile if there are new forces unleashed into the political arena in which the political consensus on which the system has thus far operated has unceremoniously collapsed. Making matters worse would be the resurgence of ethnic nationalist forces who, emboldened by the new openings, have come to assume disproportionate influence in political mobilizations and rehetoric. In such a context, ethnic polarization, tension and violence become unavoidable.

With the pre-existing political consesus brought to an end and while no new elite bargain and political consensus has been hammered out, the power struggles that the political changes have induced tend to create the conditions for instability and violence, more so in a context such as the one described in the preceding paragraph.

It has been within the above context that along with the popularly supported and widely acclaimed political changes the country has come to experience various incidents violence. The tension between neighboring regional states, the ethnic violence that displaced millions of Ethiopians, the use of force by armed militia groups or the training and arming of new regional militia groups, the loosening of the effective enforcement of law and order, the emergence in some of the security institutions of highly politicized characters are all expressions of the fact that power relations in the country continue to be in a state of flux, accentuated by the end of the old political consensus and the lack of the emergence of a new one.

Yes we don’t still know enough about the tragic events of bloody Saturday. Yes, the tragic events are outrageous and we all thus condemn them. Yet, these tragic events of bloody Saturday, viewed through the prisom of the foregoing, are not totally surprising. While those events certainly raise major questions about the reforms in the army and security sectors of the country, at their core they are political. They are in a way manefestations of the country being in the gray zone of the end of the  pre-existing political consensus and the delay in the establishment of a new consensus. The experience from the past one year has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that political reforms not founded on a new national political consensus are susceptible to the vagaries of power struggles that the absence of political consensus makes inevitable.

Incidentally, it is not impossible to anticipate that the reforms that are currently agreesaively being pursued in the economic realm as well are sure to accentuate the uncertainty and instability. These chnages are being pursued in a context that is devoid of any public participation and consultation. Despite the impact they would have not only on the economic policy space of the country but also on the positioning of various sectors of the public in the economy, they are being pursued as purely technocratic exercises, accessible only to those in the know and those that are part of and campaigning for market forces. Given that these are being implemented in the absence of a national political consensus on the transition and the direction of the country and with the public largely left out, they can even carry more impact on societal power relations and expectations about delivery by or through the state.

In the absence of an elite bargain and a new political consensu, even the political forces that returned to the country almost by default tend to operate on the basis of their own play book. In their eyes, the absence of a bargain and a new political consensus reached with their participation amount to a lack of a shared rules of the game, hence their inclination to use their own play book.

While clearly a lot of progress has been achieved since PM Abiy came to power particularly in the political space, both the transition and these changes face major risk. The source of this risk is the fact that the transition and the chnages are not grounded in a new national political consensus. Indeed, much of the troubles the country has experienced which threaten to undo all the great achievements registered are tied to this absence of a national political consensus. Thus, if the current trend of eruption of various incidents of tension, instability and violence are to be reversed and for the transition to succeed it is critical that a process of political dialogue for hamering out an elite bargain and achieve a new political consensus is urgently initiated.

This can be accomplished on the basis of what I proposed in the article on Ethiopia’s spring of hope, namely a peace plan, ‘a plan whose starting point should be addressing the troubles in the EPRDF, which have been spilling over to trigger the insecurity affecting various parts of the country. It should establish a new inclusive consensus between the members of the ruling coalition. Such a plan should also involve stabilisation of regional and local governments that experienced insecurity and violence. Additionally, the country needs such a peace plan that creates a platform for inclusive national dialogue as vehicle for truth and reconciliation and for building a rule and values based national consensus.’

The debate should not thus be whether the glass is half full or half empty. Indeed, it may as well be that there is a lot pouring into the glass & the glass may as well be filling up. In a context of absence of political consensus, the issue is that the glass itself may as well have cracked. If the crack is not fixed, the glass will break and all that is being poured into it spilt. As important as pouring new wine into a glass is thus the need of fixing the crack on the glass.

 

 

Bloody Saturday: What we know so far and what next

On Saturday 22 June, the calm and peace of two major cities in Ethiopia was violently disrupted. Two shooting incidents that targeted senior political leaders in the Amhara Regional State, one of the Federal Units of Ethiopia, and the Chief of Defense Forces took place.

The first incident took place in the lake side city of Bahir Dar, the capital of the Amhara Regional State. According to various reports, the shooting took place while the senior leadership of the Amhara Democratic Party, one of the four coalition members of the ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front, was in a meeting. In the incident, the President of the regional state Dr Ambachew  Mekonen and Ato Ezez Wase, senior advisor in the regional government, were murdered. Attorney General of the Regional Government, Ato Migabru Kebede was wounded.

The statements from ADP and the office of PM Abiy stayed that the shooting incident was organized and led by Brgadier General Asamnew Tsige, Chief of Security of the regional government. General Asamnew, who was in prison since 2009 for plotting a coup, was released as part of the pardon that PM Abiy granted for various categories of persons that were in prison. Following his release, his military credentials were reinstated and he was appointed as head of peace and security of the Amhara Rgional State.

The regional government reported that a number of suspects have been arrested and those who resisted arrest were killed in exchange of fire with security forces. However, nothing was reported on the whereabouts of Asamnew. The regional government reported that Federal security forces have assumed role in securing the region and are in collaboration with regional security forces pursuing suspects that remain at large.

The second incident took place in Addis Ababa. The shooting in Addis targeted the Cheif of Defense Forces, General Seare Mekonen. General Seare assumed this position following the release by PM Abiy of his longtime predecessor Gen Samora Yenus last year. The shooting that took place at the residence of General Seare also led to the assasination of General Seare and Major General (Rtd) Gezai Abera. As stated in the statement from PM Abiy the shooting was carried out by General Seare’s body guard. While the body guard has been apprehended, details of his background remain unknown. Also unclear is the effectiveness of the design of the security details of the most senior leader of the army.

Government statements pointed out that the two incidents are linked. Indeed, the statement of PM Abiy Ahmed defined the incident in Bahir Dar an attempted coup on the regional government and treated the two incidents as coordinated. While it is true that the two incidents happened in a matter of a few hours difference and hence appear linked, it remains unclear how the brutal killings in the two cities are related and how the assassination of General Seare happened at his residence.

The fact that the incidents led to the assassination of senior political and military leaders has sent shock waves across the country, raising fears of further insecurity, including risks of fragmentation in the security forces. Following the two incidents and dignifying the gravity of the situation, PM Abiy gave a televised address to the nation wearing a military uniform. He urged the forces to prioritize the flag and the country ahead of anything else.

The bloody shooting incidents of Saturday have led to the brutal murder of four senior political and military leaders. From what we know thus far, there remain more questions than answers: what set of events precipitated the shootings, how the shootings were organized and how they were not detected and prevented.

Clearly, the incidents show that not all well in the country, although it is difficult to tell how bad the situation is and how far it affects the security forces, particularly the army. Irrespective of lack of clarity as to the scope of the gravity of the situation, it is reasonable to assume that they are indicative of the need for addressing the causes and factors that made this situation possible. It remains to be seen in what ways these brutal killings would trigger a rethinking of the approach to the transition. Beyond and above bringing the perpetrators of these hineous acts of violence to justice, this is particularly the case in terms of recaliberating the political process for a comprehensive peace plan along the lines of what I argued in ‘Ethiopia’s spring of hope and winter of despair’ article last year captured in the paragraph quoted below

‘The country desperately needs a peace plan, a plan whose starting point should be addressing the troubles in the EPRDF, which have been spilling over to trigger the insecurity affecting various parts of the country. It should establish a new inclusive consensus between the members of the ruling coalition. Such a plan should also involve stabilisation of regional and local governments that experienced insecurity and violence. Additionally, the country needs such a peace plan that creates a platform for inclusive national dialogue as vehicle for truth and reconciliation and for building a rule and values based national consensus.’

If you think AU’s action on Sudan does not matter, think again

The African Union through its Peace and Security Council decided to suspend Sudan. Taken against the backdrop of the 3 June security operation in Khartoum that forcibly dispersed the sit-in near the military headquarters leading to large number of civilian deaths and the breakdown of negotiations for the formation of a civilian-led transitional authority, this was a logical, though not inevitable, decision to make for the PSC. It was not inevitable due to the intricate and powerful maneuvers at play and the real potential of conflating the application of Lome Declaration measures and measures to be taken for addressing the threats to stability. Some indeed argued that what the situation in Sudan requires is ensuring stability more than anything else and suspension was thus seen as a measure inconsistent with steps for stabilizing the situation. It could thus have gone to the opposite direction. On account of these scores alone, this decision constitutes a major feat, irrespective of its consequences.

But is that all today’s PSC decision on Sudan counts for? 

The conventional perception about the AU is not a positive one. Longstanding stereotypes about many things African means that dismissing the AU as a useless entity is not uncommon. So, those who write off today’s decision as inconsequential are many.

Don’t get me wrong.  My point is not to say that the AU lives up to its lofty policy pronouncements and its actions carry the level consequential weight expected of them. Indeed, there are many reasons from the way the AU is wired and operates that leaves a lot to be desired.

Yet, even with all its imperfections, the AU is not completely pointless. Indeed, it remains relevant despite all its defects. Like many things in human institutions, it also have some useful attributes. One does not need to go very far to appreciate this. If indeed the AU was inconsequential, it would not become a site for power contestations both among AU member states and those from outside.

Now to the question of what material consequences today’s decision have on the situation in Sudan.

Suspension – the TMC sought to forestall the suspension of Sudan from AU. If it did not consider it to affect it, we would not have seen it fight to prevent it. Why? Because suspension undermines the standing of the TMC. It is a statement that delegitimizes it and deprives it off its diplomatic capacity.

Why does this matter? Materially speaking, this removes the basis for engaging with international actors and mobilize and seek financial and other support. The authorities will receive no support from the AU to enable them to be shielded from international pressure. Remember how AU helped the ousted President Bashir?

With the suspension and the TMC’s delegitimization, international engagement and support will also be frozen. The TMC will face international isolation, depriving it off the capacity for engaging international financial and development partners for financial and economic support.

In the contestation between the TMC and the protest movement, today’s decision tips the balance in favor of the protesters, hence helping to limit the level of power asymmetry between the two. It affirms the legitimacy of their demand for civilian authority and lends huge diplomatic backing for their peaceful actions. It can even be considered as an act of recognition of the many civilian lives lost and the validity of their cause. After all, beyond slapping the suspension, the AU has shown firmness in demanding an independent investigation into the violations.

Today’s decision also helps in providing a framework for the engagement of international actors including the UN and the EU. They are expected to take the cue from the AU and use today’s decision for crafting their policy script on Sudan. A case in point is the press statement from the EU External Action Service. This statement issued after the AU decision stated that ‘Today’s decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to suspend Sudan from African
Union activities establishes clear criteria for the restoration of a peaceful and credible political process in order to address the legitimate aspirations of the Sudanese people.’ It goes on to state that ‘The European Union joins the African Union in calling for an immediate end to violence and a credible enquiry into the criminal events of the last days. Equally, the negotiations with the Forces for Freedom and Change towards a civilian-led Transitional Authority need to resume on the basis of agreements reached so far.’ The UN is expected to come out with a statement supporting today’s decision.

What else?

Today’s decision of the AU is also important in other aspects. For many, if the current situation was left to the Sudanese parties themselves with no external interference, the chances of them finding workable solutions are very high. Unfortunately, the situation in Sudan has become the newest victim of the Gulf rivalry. Indeed, the intervention particularly from the UAE and Saudi Arabia has become the single most factor that has complicated the transition in Sudan. Their influence over the TMC has limited the scope of maneuver for it to make concessions over the civilian-led transition. Even more disturbingly, it has been reported  that these countries encouraged the violent incidents of 3 June.

This is a major consideration in the AU PSC’s decision stating that it ‘Underscores …the fact that the Sudanese stakeholders are the sole authors of their destiny at this critical juncture in the history of their Country; In this context, stresses that there should be no external interference by whomsoever in the process of resolving the current crisis’.

So, AU’s decision of withdrawing diplomatic legitimacy from the military authority can be seen as a trimph of a multilateral based engagement of the AU over the transactional, manipulative and totally self-serving approaches of Gulf states perverting the sovereign internal political process for a negotiated transition. As such, AU’s decision  would serve as important countervailing force against their agressively counterproductive role in Sudan. This it seeks to achieve by mobilizing others including IGAD, the UN and the EU behind the parameters it has set for achieving a civilian-led authority paving the way for establishment of legitimate system of government through constitutional reform and election.

Well, at this point you may think that today’s decision has decisively set the transition in Sudan on a path for success. Such would be an overstatement. In situations such as this, no single factor can be rarely decisive. It has a role to play but much also depends on what happens next, of which no one can speak with certainty. But for now and today, the AU’s action is a major diplomatic feat with significant material consequences.

But it did not come easily. There are many who fought for it. Hats off to all those including those in the AUC, members of the PSC and the Chair of the PSC for June, Sierra Leone under the leadership of Amb Brima Patrick Kapuwa.

Today is not one of those days to write the AU off as being inconsequential and irrelevant. In the time we are in, this is not a small matter and is a good thing for a change.

Sudan after events of 3 June: Time for AU to apply Lome Declaration?

On 3 June 2019 security forces launched an operation to disperse protesters in Sudan, resulting in the most bloody incident since the start of the protests late in 2018. In a move that revealed the unwillingness of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) to continue peaceful engagement with the protest movement to form a transitional authority, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group under the command of the deputy head of the TMC, forcibly moved against the main protest camps in Khartoum where sit-ins were taking place. The excessive use of force involving live amunitions and teargas to disperse protesters who had been camping out near the military facility since the April ouster of long-time President Omar al-Bashir led to the death of over 30 people. The security forces also reportedly assaulted many protesters, blockaded roads and hospitals so that medical support could not reach the wounded and the dying. There are also reports of the RSF forces shooting at medical facilities where the wounded were receiving emergency care. Happening during the holy month of Ramadan and on eve of Eid ul Fetir, the incident transformed the atmosphere in the city and across the country.

The Sudanese Professionals Association, the coordinating body of the protest movement, announced suspension of talks with the TMC and called for total civil disobedience including closure of roads. Protesters are back on the streets. The Foreces for Declaration of Freedom and Change, which represented protesters in the negotiations with TMC, called for end of the military council and more street protests.

With the assault ending the sit-in at the heart of the protest movement, the TMC leader, Gen Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan, announced the decision of the TMC recinding all agreements reached with the protest movement. He also said that the TMC would move to set up an interim government to prepare elections in nine months.

International condemnation 

The 3 June events have been widely condemned. Mahamat in a statement issued on 3 June expressed his strong condemnation of what he called ‘the violence that erupted today which led to reported deaths and several civilian injuries’ and called for an independent investigation. On his part UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres “condemns the use of force to disperse the protestors at the sit-in site and he is alarmed by reports that security forces have opened fire inside medical facilities,” said his spokesman. Similarly, the EU, stating that there is no justification for the use of forces to disperse the peaceful sit-in, expressed its expectations that the TMC respectes ‘the right of people to voice peacefully their concerns, without any threat or use of violence’ and that the ‘priority should remain to find a swift consensus that allows a transfer of power to a civilian-led authority, as also prescribed by the African Union.’ The US and the UK issued used even stronger formulations. While  John Bolton, the US National Security Advisor, described the violence as adhorrent and said the TMC must speed transition to civilian-led transition, the Assistant Secretary of State said on Twitter that ‘We condemn the attack by #Sudan’s junta on the peaceful protesters in #Khartoum. Sudanese are calling for new leaders who will not subject them to this kind of coordinated and unlawful violence.’ Describing the attacks as ‘an outrageous step that will only lead to more polarisation and violence’, the UK Foreign Office held that the TMC ‘bears full responsibility for this action and the international community will hold it to account.’

What next for the AU? 

With these turn of events, the African Union has now to decide on whether it should wait until end of the two months period it gave to the Sudanese parties for establishing a civilian-led transitional authority and continue to postpone the application of the Lome Declaration after military seizure of power.

As the AU weighs its next steps, the question worth examining is whether the conditions for grating the TMC time for negotiating the establishment of a civilian-led transition have been lost. This depends on whether the negotiation process between the TMC and the protest movement have been completely broken down. All indications are that both parties have turned their backs on continuing with negotiations. The Foreces for Declaration of Freedom and Change, the platform negotiating on the part of the protest movement, has called off negotiations with the TMC. More crucially, as noted above, the TMC has recinded the agreements reached thus far and announced plan to form an administration for preparing elections in nine months.

Thus with the violent steps from the security forces for dispersing peaceful protests and the resultant loss of lives and injuries and with the rescinding of agreements reached thus far, there are no basis for giving the TMC more time for transferring power to a civilian-led authority.

In its communique of 27 April not only that the Peace and Security Council (PSC), AU’s peace and security decision-making organ, reiterated its condemnation of military rule and urged transfer of power for a civilian-led transitional authority, it also indicated that it reserved the right to take measures it deems necessary at any point. This is an indication that the AU does not have to wait until the end of the two month period. Indeed, it does not even need to wait the three-week briefing from a AUC Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat. The concern now is that any further appeasement will make the AU lose from all worlds – it would be unable to standby its norms and it would not either be in a position to influence events on the ground. If the AU postpones any further the application of the measures under the Lome Declaration, not only that it may set a precedent that will substantially erode its norms and longstanding practice of zero tolerance to military sizure of power but also it risks kissing its credibility good bye.