Tags
AU, conflict, geopolitics, Multilateralism, news, peacekeeping, un
Late last week, I joined diplomats, thought leaders, representatives regional organizations, academia and think tanks at a conference titled ‘Networked Multilateralism – Upgrading Partnerships’ jointly organized by Austria Mission to the UN and UN Department of Peace Operations at Greentree in Long Island, New York.
The occasion provided great platform for reflecting on the current peace and security landscape, the challenges facing multilateralism and peacekeeping, the role regional organizations and partnership between the UN and regional organizations. One of the great features of the gathering was the diversity of stakeholders and perspectives represented in the day and half engaging discussions.
This reflection on the rich exchanges captures the concluding remarks I delivered at the final segment of the event. My remarks were centred on the following questions a) What is the state of peace and security and multilateralism today? b) What do the nature and characters of the international peace and security landscape mean for the UN and its various tools including PSOs? c) what needs to be done? by whom? and How?
The critical and insightful presentations and discussions highlighted the rise in the number of conflicts and their geographic spread. They pointed out how the nature of conflicts have also changed with the emergence to prominence of new drivers of insecurity such as transnational crime and climate change. But to make sense of the current worrying state of global peace and security, there is a need for understanding in what ways the nature of conflicts have changed and why the world is experiencing conflicts and violence at the scale and breadth not seen in many decades – covering the intersection of endogenous and exogenous causes ranging from growing development deficits to crisis of legitimacy and trust in state-society relationships and unbalanced international economic relations.
Yet, the peace and security landscape is not just characterised by complexities. Apart from the heightened need for addressing root causes of conflicts including the development and legitimate state capacity deficits, of significance in this respect is also the major changes in the power relations and dynamics of member states of the UN that hugely affects the functioning of multilateral bodies and the conditions that define the current unfair econmic relationships with its deleterious consequences to the development endeavors of developing countries in particular.
Both the nature and characters of the threat environment and the changes in the power structures of the international order bear major consequences for the UN and its longstanding peace and security tools such as peace support operations. First, the scale and complexity of the threats to international peace and security are such that no one entity by itself alone can effectively respond. They necessitate that the contributions of the global and the regional bobies are systematically harnessed and collaboratively mobilized to deploy the kind of joint response that the nature and character of the threat environment warrants. Partnership between the UN and regional organizations particularly the African Union also play critical role to mitigate the legitimacy deficit facing the UN peace and security architecture premised on post WWII power dispensation.
As the insightful interventions from great friends and colleagues revealed, the peace and security tools that the multilateral system has developed such as peacekeeping have come under enormous strain. The nature of the threats is such that they cannot be dealt with using traditional peacekeeping. There is increasing demand for peace enforcement, as lead response, in places such as the Sahel. Yet, peace enforcement is not not only a panacea but its value depends also on both its use as part of a comprehensive strategy (involving development, state building, and governance interventions) rather than as the only and prominent peace and security instrument and subject to the primacy of politics and respect for IHL and applicable human rights. Additionally, the current apathy to UN PKOs expressed through the reluctance of New York to deploy new PKOs and the recent trends in pushing existing UN operations in Africa, is not indicative of its future and the possibility of its use in tandem or sequentially with peace enforcement measures.
The elevation of the partnership between the UN and regional organizations, most notabky the AU and the rise in the role of the AU is constitute critical avenues for upgrading the multilateral system. However, this is not meant to be for diminishing the UN. It is rather as critical instrument of affirming the centrality of the UN. In this context, the reliance on the contribution of the AU should not be seen and done as a gap filling measure until the bad time the UN is having in the current peace and security and geopolitical environment fades away. It should rather be seen as an embodiment of the networked multilateralism that the world of the 2020s and beyond necessitates and demands. In this regard, Resolution 2719 should not be seen principally as a funding instrument but as providing the framework for elevated partnership between the UN and the AU for delivering the promise of the UN Charter through narnesding their respective comparative advanatges.
As insightfully pointed out and for purposes of the summit of the future, in the light of the speed, scale and nature of recent developments, it my be necessary for the UN to have the kind of exercise it previously had such as the Brahimi report and the HIPPO report. Alternatively, the UN Secretary-General may be requested to prepare and submit a report that takes stock of the challenges and changes and what they mean for UN PKO. Such exercise enables both to make an informed assessment of the state of affairs of the peace and security situation and the global geopolitical environment and what these mean for UN and its peace and security tools as well as on how best to reboot and reform the system for making it fit for purpose.
While I did not have time to get into details during making my concluding thoughts, it emerged that the various issues discussed during this interesting event touch of at least four themes.
The first concerns questions of principles and values. These cover the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, principles of legitimacy and universality, upholding IHL and human rights and equity. At a time when IHL has become under direct pressure in various conflict settings such as Gaza, Ukraine and Sudan, the demand for use of peace enforcement increases the risks for protection of civilians and respect for IHL. It was thus rightly emphasized the imperative for robust monitoring and compliance mechanisms. Of course, in the context of AU led peace operations, these can draw on the rich normative commitments to IHL and human rights in various AU instruments.
The second concerns the political. At one level this is about the politics of the UNSC and the AU and its PSC and between the two. The political is also about the necessity of anchoring the use of peace support operations, including those involving peace enforcement on political strategy. The political also directly concerns the role of host country stakeholders and them playing their part by seeking and actively implementing political processes for the resolution of the conflict.
The third is the technical. Here the concern is about the range of capacities that need to be enhanced, the elaboration of the various technical instruments, exchnage of information and best practices for partnership peacekeeping and in respect to the operationalization of UNSC resolution 2719.
The fourth aspect concerns the process and working methods dimension of the partnership equation. This pertains to the working modalities and arrangements both at the level of the UN and of the AU that need to be put in place for a dynamic and effective collective action. These include joint analysis, joint assessments, consultative decision-making, early action etc.
There were sobering moments during the two days highlighting not only the challenges arising from the grim realities of the current situation but also the resistance for making the necessary changes. A case in point is the example of the deletion of the word solidarity from the pandemic prepardness accord currently under negotiations proposed by the Africa Group due to resistance from countries of the global north, which points to the lack of will to address the root causes which are linked to development and equity in the international system. Indeed, the future of multilateralism and any progress to be made under the summit of the future depends on addressing the inequities that characterise the structure and processes of the multilateral system. There were also light moments. In the end, progress may depend on gin. Instructive is also the analogy of gin, tonic and lemon for partnership.
If there is one word that captures the issues discussed, it is multidimensionlity. Multidimensionality in terms of both the multiple actors whose role is essential for revamping multilateralism and the multiple instruments/tools that need to be deployed for effectively responding to the nature of conflicts and crises of this era.